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1 Introduction * Employment polarization -the relative decline in the employment share of middle-skill/middlepay jobs and the relative increase in the employment share of low-skill/low-pay and highskill/high-pay jobs -has been one of the most striking features of the US labor market in recent decades (see Autor et al., 2006; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; and Autor and Dorn, 2013) .
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The literature has identified various possible drivers of job market polarization, and in particular three competing explanations. First, routine-biased technological change (RBTC) (Autor et al., 2003) : routine tasks, typically performed by middle-skilled workers, are easier to automate. Second, offshoring (Blinder and Krueger, 2013) : tasks that do not require a presence of the worker are more prone to be offshored and subsequently imported. This tends to affect mostly middle-skilled workers. Third, the rise of China (Autor et al., 2015) : import competition from China has particularly hit middle-skilled manufacturing workers.
In this paper, using a standard local labor market approach, we estimate the effect of all three factors identified in the literature on US labor market polarization. We contribute to the literature by considering the simultaneous effect of three factors, and by constructing measures of exposure to Global Value Chains (GVCs) and to Chinese import competition that correctly assign trade-related shocks to local labor markets, based on the source of value added. Since we measure employment polarization based on the distribution of wages across occupations, our approach allows us to draw indirect implications on the drivers of wage inequality in the US.
Using data on 722 commuting zones (which approximate local labor markets), we find * Without implicating them, we thank Sergi Basco, Giulia Felice, Bernard Hoekman, Doug Nelson, Ariell
Reshef and seminar participants in the GVC Development Report 2019 Background Paper Conference (Beijing), the European University Institute, the Italian Trade Study Group (Milan), the Sixteenth Annual Ljubljana Empirical Trade Conference (Izola, Slovenia), the 2019 Congress of the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (Geneva), and the Seventh IMF/World Bank/WTO Trade Research Workshop (Geneva) for useful comments and suggestions, as well as Adam Jakubik for invaluable help with data. This paper is not meant to represent the positions or opinions of the WTO or its members, nor the official position of any WTO staff, and is without prejudice to members' rights and obligations under the WTO. All errors are our own. 1 Several papers show that the labor markets of other non-US developed countries have also become polarized -see Goos and Manning (2007) There is evidence of job polarization also in some developing countries, although job polarization is not widespread across all developing countries. See Maloney and Molina (2016) , World Bank (2016) and Reijnders and de Vries (2017) . that employment polarization is mainly driven by their exposure to automation. GVCs lead to an increase in the employment share of relatively high-wage occupations (which we call 'skill upgrading'), while import competition from China leads to an increase in the employment share of relatively low-wage occupations (which we call 'skill downgrading'). While the combined effect of exposure to GVCs and to China is to polarize employment, exposure to automation is the most important driver of polarization. This paper is broadly related to the literature on how trade and technology contribute to within-country inequality (see Helpman, 2018 for a recent overview). The question of how offshoring, technology and Chinese import competition affected labor market polarization is also at the core of a recent paper by Breemersch et al. (2017) , who however focus on nineteen European countries. Their analysis, moreover, is at the level of industries, rather than local labor markets, and does not provide guidance on implications of employment polarization for wage inequality. Autor et al. (2015) , using a local labor market approach, try to disentangle the relative contributions of trade and technology on labor market outcomes in the US. They find that employment polarization is due to initial specialization in routine tasks (see also Autor and Dorn, 2013 for a similar result), while trade depresses employment across all occupational groups in manufacturing. However, they only consider import competition from China (as in Autor and Dorn, 2013), while we more broadly take into account various forms of value chain trade.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the econometric strategy adopted. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and present descriptive evidence of the link between employment polarization and exposure to GVCs, Chinese import competition and automation across US local labor markets. The results of the empirical analysis are in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes with a discussion of how the results relate to public attitudes towards trade and automation in the US.
Econometric strategy
To shed light on the drivers of job market polarization, we exploit differences across local labor markets in the exposure to GVC integration, Chinese import competition, and automation.
Following the literature (see, for instance, Autor et al., 2013; 2015) , US local labor markets are represented by 722 commuting zones (CZ's). CZ-level exposure to trade and technology shocks is determined by initial patterns of industry specialization within each CZ. The key identification assumption to exploit such CZ-level variation in exposure to trade and technology shocks is that labor is mobile within CZ's, and immobile across them. If this were not the case, as argued by Autor et al. (2015) , CZ-specific labor-market shocks would diffuse across space. It is thus comforting that the literature finds support for this assumption (Topel, 1986; Jean and Katz, 1992; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor et al. 2013 ).
We formulate the following baseline reduced-form equation:
where ∆Y S i is the change of wage group S = {Low, Middle, High } in total employment in CZ i in a period (for our estimations, the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] . The variables of interest are the local exposure to GVCs (GVC i ), the local exposure to Chinese import competition (China i ), and the local exposure to automation (Automation i ). We additionally include control variables at the CZ level, as well as Census division dummies (or, in a robustness exercise, State dummies) in the vector x.
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Employment polarization would be associated with an increase in the share of low-wage and high-wage groups in total employment, and a contemporaneous decrease in the share of the middle-wage group. Estimating one equation per each of the three wage groups is therefore 2 Census divisions are the following nine groupings of US states and the District of Columbia: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. Census division dummies -which are added in some specifications in Autor et al. (2013) and in all specification in Autor et al. (2015) -absorb region-specific trends in the manufacturing employment. The inclusion of State dummies is a more conservative way of controlling for such trends.
appropriate to test for employment polarization. In a robustness exercise, we employ a synthetic index of employment polarization as dependent variable. Following the spirit of Reijnders and de Vries (2017) , this is defined as:
where γ S i is the percentage points change in the employment share of wage group S in commuting zone i between 2000 and 2014. As explained by Reijnders and de Vries (2017) (who compute this index at country-level for forty countries) the EP index is positive if and only if the labor market in the corresponding commuting zone polarized, and is higher the greater is the fall in the employment share of the middle-wage group relative to the other two.
Baseline exposure measures
In this section, we describe in detail the baseline exposure measures.
GVC exposure The baseline GVC exposure measure, GVC i , is local exposure to foreign value added in US exports. It is defined as: FVAX is not the FVA in US exports from the source countries' industries that is re-exported by US industries. If, say, foreign industries A and B respectively supply 4$-and 1$-worth value added to US industry C, and the resulting 5$ end up constituting the foreign value added embodied in US exports of industry C, we assign FVA values of 4$ and 1$ respectively to US industries A and B, rather than 5$ to US industry C. This is important to be able to correctly assign GVC exposure to local labor markets. As explained by Jakubik and Stolzenburg (2018), goods exported from a downstream industry such as consumer electronics contain inputs from upstream industries such as plastics and fabricated metal products. When FVA is embodied in US electronics exports, the competing local labor markets in the US are the ones with relatively higher share of employment in upstream production activities (plastics and fabricated metal products), not those with relatively higher share of of employment in downstream production 4 All value added measures needed to build GVC and China exposure are time-varying, since we need compute their change over time (∆) . 5 We use 2000 as baseline year.
activities (consumer electronics).
China exposure The baseline China exposure measure, China i , is local exposure to import competition from China, measured by Chinese domestic value added in China's exports to the US. It is defined as: We are left with data at the level of the Chinese source industries j's.
As with the GVC exposure measure, we assign DVA j to CZ's by summing across all source industries j, weighting the sum by the CZ i's baseline-year (i.e. 2000) share of national industry employment in j (L ij L j ). We further normalize by total employment in CZ i (L i ). The measure in (2.4) thus allocates the national change in industry-level imported Chinese DVA to CZ's according to their baseline industry employment structure. Note, also, that since j represents industries where value added originates, we are able to correctly assign exposure to
Chinese import competition across local labor markets.
Automation exposure To measure local exposure to automation, Automation i , we follow Autor et al. (2015) . They compute, for each occupation o, a summary measure of routine task-intensity in 1980 (RTI o ). They then classify as routine-intensive occupations those falling in the top-third of the employment-weighted distribution of the RTI measure in 1980 (i.e., they create an occupation-based routine task-intensity dummy variable). Finally, they compute, for each commuting zone i, the fraction of employment at the start of a decade that falls in routine task-intensive occupations, RSH i . This is the measure of local exposure to automation also used in this study. 
Instruments for exposure measures
A concern when estimating the empirical model in (2.1) is the endogeneity of the three main variables of interest. In particular, there might be unobserved supply and demand shocks that simultaneously affect the described trade and technology shocks and regional employment. To deal with this endogeneity problem, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach for the exposure variables.
GVC exposure To instrument for GVC exposure we follow Kummritz (2016), who applies
Frankel and Romer (1999)'s approach to value added trade data. To get exogenous variation in value added trade flows, the idea is to use a directional value added trade resistance index that combines third country bilateral trade costs with the distance between the involved industries within the value chain. 8 The exogenous predictor for trade in value added can then be used to construct an exogenous measure of CZ-level GVC exposure.
In a first step, we predict bilateral industry-level foreign value added in US exports based only on determinants exogenous to the US industry j performance:
where j, r index industries; l indexes countries; t indexes years. In equation (2.5), FVAX jlrt is the value added of source industry j from country l in the exports of US industry r, and RI is the value added trade resistance index, which is a product of two terms. The first term is a trade cost aggregate, given by:
This is a weighted average of country l's bilateral trade costs with all c countries except US, where the weights are export shares of l to c.
9
The second term of RI -industrial distance -is the product of the upstreamness of source industry j and the downstreamness of using industry r.
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In a second step, we aggregate the fitted values of equation (2.5) across all source l countries and exporting r industries, to get the following instrument for FVAX :
We the construct the instrument for the GVC exposure measure as:
where, as in equation (2.3), ∆ is the change between 2000 and 2014.
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To boost intuition, consider the following example with four (plus one) countries -China Figure 1 shows a case in which the final product (Motor vehicles) is manufactured in and exported to RoW by Japan, using Basic metals from India,
9 As explained in Section 3, bilateral trade costs are sourced from the ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost Database and they represent a geometric average of trade cost from l to c and from c to l.
10 The industry upstreamness and downstreamness indexes are derived from Antràs et al., (2012) ; Antràs and Chor (2013); Fally (2012) . See equation (6) and Appendix A.3 in Kummritz (2016) for further details.
11 Employment variables in equation (2.8) are for the year 1990. This is similar in spirit to Autor et al (2013) , to take into account reverse causality concerns if employment is affected by anticipated trade shocks.
as well as Fabricated metals from China and Thailand. Fabricated metals that Japan sources from China and Thailand are produced using Basic metals that China and Thailand source from India.
The objective is to find a good instrument for value added in exports, the dependent variable in (2.5). Value added exports are mechanically equal to the sum of all foreign value added -in our example, the value added of Japanese exports of M is equal to the sum of the value added of India's exports of B to Japan; the value added of C's exports of F to Japan (which embodies value added of India's exports of B to China); and the value added of Thailand's exports of F to Japan (which embodies value added from India's exports of B to Thailand). Focus on India's value added in Japanese exports of M. By the very logic of value chains, as shown graphically in Figure 1 and analytically by Noguera (2012), India's value added in Japanese exports of M can be predicted by bilateral trade costs between India and China and by bilateral trade costs between India and Thailand.
12 Such 'indirect' bilateral trade costs, being exogenous to the productivity or value added of the Japanese M industry, are good predictors of the exogenous component of India's value added in Japanese exports of M.
The remaining problem for the instrumentation is that trade costs are at bilateral countrylevel (see footnote 9), while the instrument for vae in equation (2.5) should vary by countries and industries. The simple solution is again to use the GVC structure of production, with some industries being clearly more upstream than others. In the example, B is more upstream than F when it comes to providing inputs into the production of M. The larger the 'industrial distance' between B and M (in Figure 1 , inddist BM ), the more likely it is that more intermediate stages will be performed to transform B's input into M's output, and the more likely it is that third countries will be involved in this longer value chain, therefore the more likely it is that thirdcountry (i.e. indirect) bilateral trade costs will affect the foreign value added embodied in final exports. Therefore, an indicator of industrial distance such as the (inverse of) the product of the upstreamness of B and the downstreamness of M is interacted with bilateral trade costs to build the value added trade resistance index. This index, in turn, is a good instrument for value added exports in equation (2.5).
China exposure To instrument for the exposure to Chinese import competition, we follow the idea of Autor et al. (2013) . We use Chinese domestic value added in exports of goods which are exported to and consumed in other developed countries (namely, Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Spain, and Switzerland) as an instrument for Chinese domestic value added in exports of goods which are exported to and consumed in the US. The instrument for DVA is calculated as the sum of DVA embodied in final exports and DVA in intermediate exports used
by the direct importer to produce local final products. Again, China is the source and exporting country, but the destination/importing countries are now the other seven developed countries rather than the US. When summing over all exporting industries, we get industry data at the level of the Chinese source j's. We therefore construct the instrument for the China exposure as:
where DVA IV ljt is the instrument for DVA described in the above-paragraph and ∆ is the change between 2000 and 2014. problem with their approach is that both gross Chinese exports to the US and gross Chinese exports to non-US developed countries embody US value added. Since US employment is a major contributor to US value added, and Chinese exports to other countries embody US value added, Autor et al. (2013)'s instrument is mechanically correlated with US employment and hence unlikely to be valid (Jakubik and Stolzenburg, 2018).
We only use Chinese domestic value added in exports in the construction of the instrument.
The instrument is therefore relevant insofar the growth of China's domestic value added embodied in Chinese exports to non-US high-income countries is correlated with growth of China's domestic value added embodied in Chinese exports to the US (likely to be true because they both reflect positive supply shocks in China), and it is valid insofar Chinese domestic value added embodied in Chinese exports to non-US high-income countries in uncorrelated with shocks in US product demand (likely to be true because purely Chinese domestic value added does not, by definition, contain value added from other countries -most notably the US -which might be correlated with US product demand along value chains).
Automation exposure The exposure to automation is instrumented as in Autor et al. (2015) .
They build an instrument for the fraction of employment that falls in routine task-intensive occupations using historical information from 1950 on the local industry mix and the nationwide occupational structure of industries. As argued by Autor et al. (2015) , the relevance and the validity of the instrument stem from the fact that it is determined three decades prior to the onset of rapid computerization in the 1980s, so it should be correlated with the long-run component of the routine occupation share but uncorrelated with contemporaneous innovations to this share.
Alternative exposure measures
We present two robustness exercises where we build alternative exposure measures. First, we construct China exposure in a way similar to what is done in Autor et al. (2013) , adapting the GVC exposure variable accordingly. In the second, we use an alternative GVC exposure variable, based on foreign value added in US production. pure double counting from domestic source; and pure double counting from foreign sources. We use China as exporting country and the US as destination country, aggregate over all source countries and exporting industries, and allocate the resulting (source) industry-level data to CZ's using employment shares, as described above.
14 Note that we deviate from Autor et al.
(2013) by: 1) not including the US as a source country. This breaks the mechanical mechanical correlation between US employment and Chinese import competition; and 2) matching source industries instead of exporting industries to US industries in building China exposure variables.
The construction of the corresponding instrumental variable (which is the variable used in the robustness exercise) is analogous to the the construction of the baseline instrument for the China exposure variable described in Section 2.2. That is, we replace US as the destination country by seven other developed countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, 14 Recall that our DVA CN j variable used to compute the baseline China exposure variable is just the sum of DVA embodied in final exports and DVA in intermediate exports that are used by the direct importer to produce local final products. The problems with double counting are discussed in Jakubik and Stolzenburg (2018).
Spain, Switzerland) in the aggregation of DVA flows.
We also adjust the GVC exposure variable to avoid any overlap with the China exposure variable just described. In particular, we subtract from the FVAX measure of Section 2.1 China's exports to the US which are re-exported by the US. The subtracted trade flow is equal to: 
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As usual, we sum over all source countries, destination countries, and exporting industries, and allocate the resulting source industry-level data to CZ's using employment shares.
The construction of the corresponding instrumental variable (which is the variable used in the robustness exercise) is analogous to the the construction of the baseline instrument for the China exposure variable described in Section 2.2. That is, we replace US as the destination country by seven other developed countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Spain, Switzerland) in the aggregation of (the modified) FVA flows.
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GVC exposure measure using FVA in production Instead of analyzing the effect of FVA in US exports, we alternatively look at FVA in US production (FVAY ). The variable is 15 Note that we approximate FVA in Chinese exports which is re-exported by the US by the respective share in DVA.
16 As a technical note, to build the instrument for FVAX we need to distribute the subtraction term in equation (2.10) -at the level of source country and source industry -over US exporting industries according to the distribution of FVA in US exports (intermediates plus final) over US exporting industries. This is because we need disaggregated data by exporting country, exporting industry, source country, and source industry, while the subtraction term in (2.10) does not include information on US exporting industries (just on Chinese exporting industries).
constructed as follows. First, we build a dataset where the US is the exporting country, all countries except the US are the source countries, all countries except the US are the destination countries, and we consider all source and exporting industries. We sum over the following value added trade flows: DVA in intermediate exports used by the direct importer to produce local final products; DVA embodied in final exports; DVA in intermediate exports used to produce intermediates that are re-exported to third countries for production of local final products; DVA first exported but which eventually returns and is consumed at home; FVA embodied in intermediate exports; FVA embodied in final exports; pure double counting from domestic source; and pure double counting from foreign sources. Second, we multiply the resulting VA trade flows with (US) industry production-to-export ratios (sourced from WIOD data), to get FVA in US production. Third, we subtract Chinese DVA in intermediate exports that are used by the direct importer (the US) to produce local final products. This is to avoid overlaps with the China exposure variable (which incorporates this Chinese DVA in intermediate exports).
The variable FVAY is then constructed in the same way as the baseline GVC exposure measure FVAX. We sum over all source countries, destination countries, and exporting industries. The resulting (source) industry data is allocated to CZ's by using employment shares.
The corresponding IV variable is also constructed in the same way as the IV for the baseline GVC exposure measure.
17

Data
The employment data come from the American Community Survey (ACS). By means of various crosswalks, we map the Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) available in the ACS data to 17 In this case, too, to construct IV variable corresponding to FVAY we have to distribute the subtraction term -at the level of source country (China) and source industry -over US exporting industries according to the distribution of FVA in US production over US exporting industries. This approach is necessary because the subtraction term does not include information on US exporting industries (just on Chinese exporting industries), and the required data is disaggregated by exporting country, exporting industry, source country, and source industry.
CZ's.
18 Industry-level employment is constructed by reclassifying the ACS data (which comprises 246 industries) to the more aggregated industry structure of the trade flow data (56 industries in ISIC Rev. 4).
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The three wage groups are built based on wage data from the Occupational Employment
Statistics (OES) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). We order US Standard Occupational
Classification (SOC) occupations (23 major groups) by their average national wage in 2000.
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As illustrated in Figure 2 , the sorting of occupations in the three categories (Low-, Middle-and High-wage) is straightforward. We match the SOC occupations to those in the ACS by using a crosswalk from the US Census Bureau. (2000), and include the share of employment in manufacturing, the share of population that is collegeeducated, the share of population that is foreign-born, and the female employment rate.
Descriptive statistics
We show in Table 1 
Results
We start with ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in Table 2 . GVC exposure is associated with a decrease in the employment shares of the low-wage group, and an increase in the employment share of the high-wage group. This result is consistent with a skill upgrading effect of GVCs. China exposure is associated with an increase in the employment share of the low-wage group, consistently with skill downgrading. Exposure to automation, in turn, is associated with increased in the employment shares of the low-wage and of the high-wage groups, and a decrease in the employment share of the middle-wage group. Automation is, therefore, the driver of wage polarization.
The instrumental variable estimation results which use the exposure variables discussed in Section 2.2 largely confirm the patterns from the OLS regressions. Table 3 strongly confirms the results that GVCs are associated with skill upgrading and automation leads to employment polarization. Exposure to Chinese import competition, when significant (column (8)), is associated with skill downgrading.
Standardized beta coefficients presented in Table 3 help get a sense of the relative contribution of the three exposure variables to changes in employment shares across US commuting zones. In column (3), one can see that the positive effect of automation exposure and of China exposure on the low-wage group share are very similar in size. The same is true for the positive effects of GVC exposure and of automation exposure on the high-wage group share (column (9)). Remarkably, the largest impact across exposure measures and wage groups is the negative effect of exposure to automation on the middle-wage group share (columns (4) and (6)), which reinforces the conclusion that automation leads to employment polarization by pushing down employment in middle-wage occupations. Table A Table 4 presents the IV results with alternative construction of the GVC and of the China exposure variables.
First-stage results, presented in Appendix
24 In columns (1)-(3), the China exposure is built in a way similar to Autor et al. (2013)'s, and the GVC exposure variable is adjusted accordingly (see discussion in the first part of Section 2.3). (The variable for automation exposure remains the same as in Table 3 ). As in baseline results, GVC exposure decreases the employment share of low-wage occupations and 23 These F-test statistics refer to the estimations in columns (3), (6) and (9) of Table 3 . 24 In the remainder, we present regressions with all the three main variabes of interest included.
increases the employment share of high-wage occupations. The impact of exposure to China loses statistical significance for any wage group. This might indicate that any 'China-shock' effects are sensitive, among others, to how the China shock is measured. Finally, exposure to automation significantly reduces middle-wage occupations' employment shares, and increase employment shares of low-and high-wage occupations (although the results in columns (1) and (3) are only significant at the 15%). Qualitatively, therefore, regressions of columns (1)- (3) of Table 4 confirm the skill-upgrading effect of GVCs and the employment polarizing effect of automation.
Columns (4)- (6) of Table 4 display IV results using foreign value added in US production, rather than in US exports, as relevant variable to construct GVC exposure (see discussion in the second part of Section 2.3). (The variables for China exposure and for automation exposure remain the same as in Table 3 ). The results when using FVA in production are qualitatively the same as, and quantitatively very similar to, the baseline IV results of Table 3 .
Next, we estimated regressions using the EP index of (2.2) as dependent variable. The results are displayed in Table 5 . Across the four specifications -OLS with the baseline exposure measures of Section 2.1 in column (1), IV with the baseline exposure measures of Section 2.2 in column (2), IV with the alternative exposure measures of Section 2.3 in columns (3) and (4) -it can be seen that exposure to automation is the driver of employment polarization. This is consistent with the descriptive evidence presented in Figure 4 , as well as with the regression results using shares of wage groups in total employment as dependent variable presented so far.
All the results presented so far include Census division dummies. We also performed regressions using a richer set of geographical dummies, namely State dummies. The results, presented in Appendix table A-3, largely confirm the results with Census division dummies.
Finally, we also computed employment variables as shares of total hours worked rather than shares of total employment. The results -available in Appendix table A-4 -are in line with the results that use shares of employment.
Employment levels
In Table 6 , we present results for the levels of total employment and employment by skill group.
These results shed more light on the mechanisms that drive the change in employment shares.
First, in line with Autor et al. (2013) , the exposure to Chinese import competition decreases total employment in the exposed local labor market. This is moslty due to a decline in high-skill employment (column (4)). Hence, our baseline result that Chinese import competition leads to an increased share of low-skill workers in total employment is not driven by an actual increase in low-skill employment but rather by a decrease in the employment of other skill categories.
Second, GVC exposure has the exact opposite effect on the numbers of employed workers. It does not significantly decrease low-skill employment while it increases the employment of high skill workers, leading to an increase in total employment in the local labor market and shifting the employment share from low-skill to high-skill workers. Finally, automation does not have a systematic effect on the overall employment levels. Rather, it changes the skill composition of the employed workforce in line with our baseline results.
Conclusions
We have shown that in US local labor markets employment polarization is mostly driven by automation. Since our measure of employment polarization is based on wages, one implication of our research is that technology is the driving force behind wage inequality.
Our results are consistent with a large body of research -surveyed in Helpman (2018) -finding that globalization in the form of foreign trade and offshoring has not been a large contributor to rising inequality, even across US regions.
It is interesting to discuss the results of this paper in relation to public attitudes towards trade and automation. Despite the received wisdom of a general backslash against globalization, public attitudes towards trade are positive in the United States. 74% of US respondents to the latest PEW Global Attitudes Survey agreed that growing trade and business ties with other countries is a good thing for the US, up from 68% in 2014. Moreover, the majority of US respondents (36%) think that trade creates jobs (as opposed to trade destroying jobs -34% -or trade does not making a difference in terms of jobs -24%). And US respondents are equally split between those who argue that trade increase wages and those who argue that trade decrease wages (31% each), while 30% of respondents think that trade does not make a difference in terms of wages (Pew Research Center, 2018) .
Public attitudes towards job automation, on the other hand, show that people in the United
States are well aware of the link between job automation and increasing inequality. 76% of US respondents to the latest PEW Global Attitudes Survey agreed that the inequality between the rich and poor would increase with further job automation (Pew Research Center, 2018).
25
Our results might help explain why attitudes towards the labor market effects of trade are neutral if not positive, while attitudes towards the effects of job automation on inequality are negative in the US. 
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